An unbelievable proposal by the Ontario Power Authority (OPA) for a deep underground radioactive waste repository a half mile from the shore of Lake Huron is in the works. If the plan succeeds, all of Ontario's “low and intermediate” level radioactive garbage, will eventually be transported to and permanently buried at the site, which is part of the extensive Bruce nuclear complex.

What is low and intermediate?  Anything radioactive, from mops and clothing, to reactor tubes and components, is included in the categorization. The "intermediate" level waste requires special handling and can pose risks for significant periods of time.

But “low and intermediate” are arbitrary and fuzzy categories based primarily on the types of material and the overall gamma radiation dose rates.  Many observers believe that this is a totally inadequate method for determining the ultimate risks these materials could pose to the environment and especially to human health..  What is needed is a complete inventory of the specific radionuclides and their inherent radio-toxic characteristics and capabilities to do biological harm over specified periods of time.  To the best of my knowledge, no such complete analysis of the elements in so-called low and intermediate waste has been undertaken.  

We are told that nuclear reactor fuel waste will not be placed in this facility.  But this proposed repository could easily be a “Trojan Horse” for a full scale geological dump for “high-level” irradiated reactor fuel bundles, i.e., the really hot, lethal and incredibly nasty, radioactive stuff!  More about that in a moment.

While thinking about this issue, it is important to bear in mind that any amount of ionizing radiation increases cancer risks, as concluded by the U.S. National Academy of Science (NAS)  report on radiation risk, (Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation).

When the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency (CEAA)  issued its draft Environmental Impact Statement guidelines for this project for public comment, I raised several salient points in my response:

Why, I asked, was the deep underground repository option chosen?
    
 The explanation in the proponent’s (Ontario Power Authority’s) original proposal was that "The deep geologic repository is being pursued as the preferred technology because of its greater margin of safety."

 It seemed to me that the proponent must explain exactly why an underground facility of this kind would provide a greater margin of  safety than the alternatives identified in its proposal. I understand that some other countries  such as the Czech Republic and Australia favor near surface engineered facilities for containment and monitoring of low and intermediate level radioactive wastes.

 
Why would anyone want to construct such a site so near to one of the Great Lakes (Lake Huron)? 

Lake Huron is one of the major bodies of  fresh water in North America–part of the Great Lakes System.  I believe that the proponent should be required to demonstrate why such a facility is to be sited on the shores of this lake. It is possible that any leaking radioactive material from the repository could impact both Canadians and U.S. residents.

I requested that the proponent be required to give a detailed explanation as to why it did not seek an alternative inland underground site which would be clearly outside of the geological zone that could affect the Great Lakes, in order to completely avoid the possibility of radioactive contamination of the lakes.  There should be zero tolerance for the permanent geological  emplacement of any radioactive wastes in the Great Lakes basin.  It is simply common sense!
 
But the big question for me is: Could this project be eventually extended to accommodate nuclear fuel waste? 

The guideline must deal more directly with the question of the possible future expansion of the proposed facility to accommodate nuclear fuel waste. Simple verbal assurances from contemporary individuals and organizations are meaningless in view of the lengthy isolation time frames required for much radioactive waste and irradiated nuclear fuel waste..

The main questions I raised in my comments are:

Why did Canada’s (industry dominated) Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO), in its final report in 2004, identify the types of rock formations which happen to be present at the proposed Bruce nuclear complex as being suitable for permanent underground storage of irradiated nuclear fuel waste?  Previously, granite rock of the Canadian Shield was considered the preferred host medium. 

Why is the limestone rock at the site considered suitable for any kind or level of radioactive waste, given the well-known connection between limestone and underground water sources?

Why, indeed, is this proposal for a radioactive waste repository on the shores of Lake Huron being contemplated at all?

Get involved!

http://www.nukeshaft.ca

 

 

NUCLEAR EXPANSION: THE ROAD TO OBLIVION?

Like the tobacco companies of yore, the nuclear establishment is currently aggressively marketing its dubious products. Most recently, the industry has been bombarding the public with ads to the effect that nuclear energy is clean, safe and environmentally friendly; depicting it as an important tool in dealing with climate change and global warming. Nothing could be further from the truth.

This paper summarizes the downside of expanding nuclear power, which requires processes which cause noxious emissions as well as highly irradiated toxic fuel waste, uses non-renewable and ever more costly uranium deposits with increasing amounts of energy inputs, emits radioactive tritium into the air and water, contributes greatly to the Canadian national debt, is the basis for nuclear weapons proliferation, and is a desirable target for terrorism. It is a technology that must have an impossible-to-achieve perfect record of zero tolerance for serious accidents over an entire reactor life cycle, as there is no safe level of ionizing radiation.

Yes, nuclear energy does boil water which is converted to electricity, that is when not in a shut- down state for frequent maintenance. Yes, there are much safer, cheaper and environmentally friendly alternatives. Yes, our politicians are idiots if they pursue the nuclear option.

Please feel free to use this commentary and the material below to help prevent nuclear expansion and to promote nuclear phase-out along with a rapid increase in safe renewable energy alternatives, conservation and efficiency.

Walt Robbins

March, 2007 

 

Did you know that the nuclear energy is responsible for the release of large quantities of greenhouse gasses and other noxious emissions?

     According to a December 14, 2006 report by the Pembina Institute, no other energy source combines the generation of as wide a range of conventional pollutants and waste streams-including heavy metals, smog-and acid-rain precursors and greenhouse gases. It notes that “...total greenhouse gas emissions associated with uranium mining, milling, refining, conversion and fuel fabrication in Canada are estimated at between 240,000 and 366,000 tonnes of CO2 per year.”

Did you know that harmful emissions from the nuclear industry will continue to increase as supplies of rich uranium ore decrease?

     According to scientists Jan Willem Storm van Leeuwen and Philip Bartlett Smith, “...at the present rate of use, worldwide supplies of rich uranium ore will soon become exhausted, perhaps within the next decade. Nuclear power stations of the future will have to rely on second-grade ore, which requires huge amounts of conventional energy to refine it. For each ton of poor-quality uranium, some 5000 tons of granite that contain it will have to be mined, milled and then disposed of. This could rise to 10,000 tons if the quality deteriorates further. At some point, and it could happen soon, the nuclear industry will be emitting as much carbon dioxide from mining and treating its ore as it saves from the so-called clean power it produces thanks to nuclear fission.” The researchers estimate that “The use of nuclear power causes, at the end of the road and under the most favourable conditions, approximately one-third as much carbon dioxide emission as gas-fired electricity production.”

Did you know that nuclear power production could well go into energy deficit as rich ore quantities are consumed?

     According to Energy writer David Fleming in Prospect magazine, “...it would be putting more energy into the process than it could extract from it. Its contribution to meeting the world's energy needs would become negative! The so-called reliability of nuclear power, which its proponents enthuse over, would therefore rest on the growing use of fossil fuels rather than their replacement.”

Did you know that nuclear reactors routinely emit other noxious substances, one of the worst of which is radioactive tritium into the environment?

     According to Dr. Gordon Edwards of the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, “Tritium poses an ever-present radiological hazard to CANDU (reactor) workers. It is also an environmental contaminant which pollutes the drinking water of many communities situated near CANDU reactors. In addition, atmospheric emissions of tritium are readily inhaled -- and also absorbed directly through the skin -- by residents living near CANDU reactors.”

 

 Did you know that you, the taxpayer, are footing much of the bill and incurring much of the national debt, for Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd’s (AECL’s) nuclear expansion?

     According to a recent Energy Probe study, federal subsidies to AECL since its inception in 1952 amount to $74.9 billion of today’s (2006) Federal Government debt (about 12 per cent of the entire outstanding amount).

Did you know that no acceptable solution for the permanent disposition of irradiated reactor fuel waste as yet exists in Canada?

     According to the Canadian federal environmental assessment panel (Seaborn) report released in March, 1998 after an eight year intensive public process “... the (AECL) concept in its current form for deep geologic disposal does not have broad public support, and does not have the required level of acceptability to be adopted as Canada's approach for managing nuclear fuel wastes."

Did you know that Canada’s nuclear industry-based Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO, in November, 2005, after a three year study, continued to endorse the permanent underground burial of irradiated nuclear fuel wastes?

      According to Elizabeth May, former Executive Director of the Sierra Club of Canada and currently leader of the Green Party of Canada, “...the NWMO has taken its mandate and skewed it to allow them to make decisions that are industry-biased, and not based on health, safety and security measures.”

Did you know that if all of Canada’s current nuclear waste is transported to a centralized location for storage or permanent burial, shipments by rail, highway and waterway, would be continuous, and over many years, possibly decades?

     According to Nuclear Waste Watch, ( a network of thirty environmental, social and other groups across Canada) "the potential recipient and transport route communities should all have veto power, and should receive funding from proponents for independent research and community education."

Concerns expressed by many groups opposed to nuclear waste transportation include property value losses along the transportation corridor, the routine radiation exposure during handling and transit, worst case scenario radiation exposure, health and environmental costs, and more potential for accidents and terrorist acts resulting from greater shipment frequency and duration of shipments.

 

 

Did you know that no safe level of ionizing radiation exists?

     According to a 2005 report of a US National Academy of Sciences panel (Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation--BEIR VII), investigating the dangers of low energy, low-dose ionizing radiation, “..it is unlikely that a threshold exists for the induction of cancers... Further, there are extensive data on radiation-induced transmissible mutations in mice and other organisms. There is therefore no reason to believe that humans would be immune to this sort of harm.”

 

Did you know that terrorists could use nuclear reactors and nuclear waste as weapons of mass destruction?

     According to journalist Jeffrey St. Clair, shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S., it was widely reported that al-Qaeda had given serious consideration to crashing commercial aircraft into several nuclear plants on that day. In his September 14, 2002 Counterpunch article (The Fire Next Time), he reports that al-Qaeda operatives Ramzi bin al-Shaibah and Khaled al-Sheikh Mohammad told Al-Jazeera interviewer Yosri Fouda, that future attacks on Western nuclear facilities could not be ruled out.

But the real Achille’s heel at a nuclear plants is the adjacent spent fuel facility, which contains major concentrations of highly radioactive material. They lack the heavy duty containment safeguard provided for the reactor, and could be considered "sitting ducks" for disastrous terror attacks. Large explosions, along with major fire resulting in radioactive release from spent fuel would have serious health, social and economic consequences for people in the surrounding geographical area. It should be noted that many of our nuclear facilities are in close proximity to the Great Lakes. Any ecological disaster resulting from terrorism could affect water quality in both Canada and the United States.

Did you know that more nuclear reactors can lead directly to greater nuclear weapons proliferation?

     According to Dr. Helen Caldicott, as a result of the projected “...renaissance of the nuclear power industry, twenty-five countries and consortia will have access over a period of two decades to Generation IV reactors fueled by plutonium.” In her book, Nuclear Power is Not the Answer, Dr. Caldicott reminds us that “Canada supplied India with a CIRUS heavy water reactor for making nuclear energy. . . It was this reactor that gave India the plutonium it used in its first 1974 nuclear weapons test.”

     

 

This image speaks for itself.  While not blogging about the risks of nuclear energy and especially nuclear waste,
I can play some jigs and reels to get this awful subject off my mind for a little while anyway. 

March, 2006

 

 Shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S., it was widely reported that al-Qaeda had given serious consideration to crashing commercial aircraft into several nuclear plants on that day.

 

According to journalist Jeffrey St. Clair, in his September 14, 2002 Counterpunch article (The Fire Next Time), al-Qaeda operatives Ramzi bin al-Shaibah and Khaled al-Sheikh Mohammad told Al-Jazeera interviewer Yosri Fouda, that future attacks on western nuclear facilities could not be ruled out.

 

 While it is true that nuclear reactors are housed in buildings that are among the most durable modern structures in existence, and have been designed to (hopefully) withstand the force of earthquakes, no one had ever conceived of a direct impact from a large commercial aircraft full of aviation fuel or from some other similar massive explosive assault.

 

 Some authorities state that the consequences would be truly catastrophic.

 

But the real Achilles heels at nuclear plants are the adjacent spent fuel facilities, which contain major concentrations of highly radioactive material. They lack the heavy duty containment safeguard provided for the reactor, and could be considered "sitting ducks" for disastrous terror attacks.

 

Large explosions, along with major fire resulting in radioactive release from spent fuel would have serious health, social and economic consequences for people in the surrounding geographical area. It should be noted that many of our nuclear facilities are in close proximity to the Great Lakes. Any ecological disaster resulting from terrorism could affect both Canada and the United States.

 

Unfortunately, none of the discussion papers commissioned by the Canadian Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) deals forthrightly and directly with the need to "harden" existing spent fuel facilities at reactor-sites to better protect them from such an attack. Some of the discussion papers deal with nuclear waste security, but in rather general and overly reassuring terms. These discussion papers are available to the public from the NWMO. The references to pertinent discussion papers follow my commentary on the discussion documents dealing with the security of nuclear waste:

 

In my view, the NWMO discussion papers (with the exception of the final one by Ed Lyman of the Union of Concerned Scientists), do not truly come to grips with the growing threat of extremist Islamic terrorism in the world, and how spent nuclear fuel could be used to further that threat.

 

 Perhaps one reason for this is that Canada, unlike many other countries, has, thankfully, not yet been subjected to these barbaric attacks. Another possibility is that Canadian authorities are actually working on the problem, but prefer to keep their efforts quiet----for security reasons. In any event, none of these papers directly identify, in any degree of detail, possible kinds of terrorist scenarios and how Canada could develop plans to deal with them.

 

Mostly, the papers hide behind administrative requirements and regulations of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, almost as if somehow the rule book itself provides a wall of protection.

 

1 Transportation of spent nuclear fuel:

 

Several discussion papers emphasize that there have been no attacks on spent fuel shipments anywhere in the world. But, some also point out that there have been relatively few spent fuel shipments. If spent fuel is to be moved from reactor sites to any centralized locations, shipment frequency would increase dramatically over decades. It is hard to imagine that such a change would escape the notice of terrorists who are becoming increasingly sophisticated with their information networks and their technology for destructive acts.

 

Lauding past performance is not a comforting response to the potential threats of the future.

 

 Assertions to the effect that attacks upon spent fuel shipments would fail, or produce very limited negative consequences, or that safeguards in the present security system are adequate, minimize the fact of the rapid advance of destructive technologies now in use or potentially available to those who wish to do us harm.

 

And, as Mr. Bin Laden and his gang of religious fanatics have indicated, all of us who are not in his camp, can be considered "infidels" and fair game.

 

 Are contemporary spent fuel transportation casks on trucks or trains sufficiently "robust" to withstand a major, high yield type of attack?

 

 Many nuclear watchdog groups and others, point out that governments have not undertaken the kinds of full scale tests required, and therefore, the question cannot be reliably answered.

 

As one paper points out, other transported substances might be more easily used by terrorists. Perhaps, but that overlooks the essence of the terrorist mentality and objectives; i.e., to terrorize the public. The large scale psychological impact on the public from damage or destruction of a radioactive nuclear source (as contrasted with any other substance) should never be underestimated.

 

Any contemplated large-scale, long-time period movement of spent nuclear fuel from reactor sites to some centralized storage or repository site, is, for me, truly a "non-starter." Furthermore, I am fully confident that communities along nuclear waste transportation routes would veto any such plan.

 

2 Security of the storage options themselves:

 

 In spite of the reassuring words about security of the various options in some of the above cited discussion papers, no concrete evidence has been presented that any one of the nuclear waste management options is really secure from large scale terrorist attacks. The onus has been placed upon current regulatory standards which were produced for a bygone age. Nowhere (with the exception of Ed Lyman's paper) have some of the key technical issues surrounding terrorism even been identified. Nowhere in these papers has the central issue of the need for securing and "hardening" on-reactor-site storage facilities against contemporary terrorist methodology, been addressed.

 

As long as the reactors are operating, there will always be about a ten year (cooling off) inventory of high-level nuclear waste at the reactor sites, even if the older waste is moved somewhere else. The technical problems surrounding the security of that on-site waste must be addressed. That they have not been adequately addressed in the NWMO discussion papers dealing with the subject of security, is a very serious deficiency; one which would make any attempt at the selection of a final nuclear waste management option, a dubious exercise at best.

 

Outside of a general recognition of need, specific security problems and protections for the centralized (above or below ground) storage option were not mentioned. Both a centralized storage facility and an underground repository facility share some of the same security risks; i.e., transportation to them, as well as vulnerability of protracted surface exposure at the destination, including loading and unloading, repackaging, and movement to the final resting place.

 

Advocates of "permanent" underground burial in a deep geological repository have long insisted that their option is virtually completely secure; from theft, terrorism, accidents, etc. As indicated above, the permanent burial option is still subject to the security risks of transportation and the exposed surface destination. Nor does burial solve the problem of the "hot" waste that must remain at the reactor sites for a decade before being moved.

 

Can geological repositories really remain secure for thousands, or even hundreds of years? Some scientists think not and suggest that such facilities could become "plutonium mines" of the future. An underlying premise of the burial concept is that the waste would not only become irretrievable, but the waste repositories themselves, would require "no institutional controls."

 

Given the advance of science and technology, there is absolutely no reason to believe that a sealed-up underground facility would need any fewer institutional controls than an aboveground one. It would be prudent to assume that those in the future who might want to extract the contents of an underground nuclear burial place, will have the capabilities to do so with whatever technologies, and for whatever purposes they may then have.

 

 In any event, by now it should be crystal clear that this "out-of-sight-out-of-mind" approach was not embraced by a public which was confronted with the spectre of permanent geological burial. Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd., (AECL) discovered this in the 1980's while trying to implement such a program in the Canadian Shield rock in Manitoba and Ontario.

 

More recently, media accounts of an NWMO commissioned study (Citizens' Dialogue on the Long-term Management of Used Nuclear Fuel, July, 2004) reported that "Canadians want the radioactive waste from their nuclear reactors stored within reach, not dropped down holes deep into the rocky Precambrian Shield and forgotten. And they don't trust government, industry or existing regulators with the job."

 

 In the U.S., the Commission which studied the circumstances that led up to the tragic events of September 11, 2001, pointed to a "lack of imagination" on the part of the intelligence community. I note a singular lack of imagination in most of the Canadian NWMO discussion papers that deal with the subject of security and nuclear waste. There is an unmistakable aura of smugness and complacency in some of these writings which I find disquieting. They convey the message "Don't worry, we have it all under control." Anytime I hear that kind of message on a subject of this gravity--I do indeed worry. And so should we all! 

 

 Pertinent Discussion Papers :

 

One discussion paper, numbered 3-3, is under the category, Health and Safety, and entitled the Status of Canadian and International Efforts to Reduce the Security Risk of Nuclear Fuel Waste, (by Science Applications International Corporation).

 

It is an overview of current security requirements and applications to future management possibilities and includes basic information about how nuclear waste is currently generated and how it is managed in Canada and internationally. It assesses the nature and extent of potential threats against nuclear waste and provides a section on current security measures including a "risk management approach." It also summarizes Canadian and international security requirements, as well as application of existing security regulations in the context of storage, disposal, reprocessing and transportation. One of its main conclusions is that current storage management as well as future management options meet Canadian and International requirements; that there have been no "credible threats" to the fuel waste and that the present system acts as a deterrent to "...the current crop of potential terrorists."

 

Several other NWMO discussion papers deal with security of spent fuel transportation:

 

Number 6.8, under the Technical Methods category is called Review of the fundamental issues and key considerations related to the transportation of spent nuclear fuel, by Gavin J. Carter of Butterfield Carter and Associates, L.L.C.

 

In its Section 8 (Security Requirements) this paper concludes that transportation of spent fuel "can be managed safely" and is a "low risk activity." It notes that illegal procurement or attacks on a shipment of spent fuel has never occurred anywhere in the world. International Atomic Energy Agency, (IAEA) in 1972 first published guidelines for physical protection, used by governments in member countries. Its most recent document is INFCIRC/225/Rev.4. (1980) which requires specific arrangements and meeting of defined standards of physical protection for movements of nuclear material. The paper notes the existing use of armed guards in certain transport situations e.g., plutonium, (or spent fuel through heavy populated areas in some countries). Some of its main conclusions are that hazardous material is not an appealing target for thieves as it is difficult to handle, and of little financial or practical value; that spent fuel casks are "... too unwieldy to move quickly", etc. ( difficult for someone to steal or to use for a "dirty bomb"). It notes that "...shipments of spent fuel take place relatively infrequently. As for a terrorist attack, the paper asserts that "A large explosive charge would be necessary to breach the containment of the cask. Even if this is achieved, a dangerous disbursement of radioactive materials will not necessarily occur." The section on security concludes with the statement that "... there are many substances being transported much more frequently every day that would be more attractive options for terrorists than spent fuel casks."

 

Discussion Paper Number 6-6, under the Technical Methods category, is titled Status of Transportation Systems of High-level Radioactive Waste Management, by Wardrop Engineering, Inc.

 

 This paper reviews the status of plans for transport of used fuel in various countries and deals with possible methods of transportation to a centralized storage or underground repository facility in Canada. This paper observes that "...though large-scale shipments of used fuel are not currently conducted in Canada, it is a distinct possibility in the future." In its section 6.10, "Transportation Security Plans," it provides a general statement of Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) license and threat assessment requirements. It does identify some of the measures that might be required for security, such as armed guards, escort personnel, and response forces. In addition to security of transportation issues, several other papers review security aspects of some of the management options themselves.

 

Discussion Paper 6-1, under the Technical Methods category, is titled Status of Reactor Site Storage Systems For Used Nuclear Fuel, by Senes Consultants Limited

 

Primarily, this paper reviews methods and plans for on-site nuclear waste storage throughout Canada. Some tangential issues are covered, including Security (in section 3.3).

 

As is the case with some of the other papers dealing with security issues, it mainly addresses the basic CNSC regulatory framework with a general description of the procedures that must be followed for the security of spent nuclear fuel. Although it does not address the need for further securing or "hardening" of on-site storage against high-impact terrorist threats, it does recognize public concern. It states that during NWMO workshops and discussion groups, in the wake of September 11, 2001, participant comments "...reflected concerns about the security of fuel currently stored at the reactor sites.

 

" Paper 6-3, under the Technical Methods category is titled Status of Geological repositories for Used Nuclear Fuel, by Charles McCombie, McCombie Consulting

 

This paper provides an overview and assessment of the international status and developments of the underground "disposal" (burial) option for the long-term management of nuclear waste. Much of the paper relates to the safety of this option. The issue of security as related to the underground burial option (section 4.3) is presented in general terms making the point that "...ensuring that there can be no unauthorised access to these materials, is vital throughout the whole fuel cycle." The paper maintains that security would be enhanced by the implementation of geological repositories, and suggests a global system of a fewer number of such facilities. There is, however, recognition of the larger transportation problems resulting from such a system.

 

Discussion Paper 6-2, under the Technical Methods category, is titled Status of Centralized Storage Systems for Used Nuclear Fuel, by Mohan Rao and Dave Hardy of Hardy Stevenson and Associates Limited.

 

 In its examination of the centralized storage option, this paper lacks a specific section on the security issue. It does state that since centralized storage systems could have a long lifetime, they should "...include appropriate features that address security and safeguards issues such as proliferation and terrorism by limiting possibilities through which such acts could be carried out."

 

Two additional NWMO papers deal specifically with the security issue:

 

Discussion paper 1-4 Guiding Concepts: Nuclear Waste Management in Canada: The Security Dimension, by Franklyn Griffiths, Ignatieff Chair Emeritus of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Toronto

 

This paper deals directly with the security aspects of nuclear waste management. It develops the idea of a dichotomy between centralized national security needs on the one hand, and the need to address individual human security needs on the other. So any national security perspective would need to be "enlarged" to involve the public as a whole in discussions. Griffiths maintains that the two perspectives are not entirely compatible when applied to options for nuclear waste management. He concludes that the NWMO has an opportunity to "make a human security effort to gain support for an agreed approach." Failing that, the Canadian public might embrace the idea of a continued on-site storage option and join in international efforts to explore other alternatives, (.e.g., one or more international repositories, transmutation of long-lived radionuclides). He also considers that an integrated approach between national and human security could be attempted.

 

 One other paper on security (unnumbered) was provided by the NWMO, titled Comments on "Nuclear Waste Management in Canada: The Security Dimension," by Prof. Franklyn Griffiths."

 

The author of these comments is Edwin S. Lyman, Senior Scientist, Global Security Program, Union of Concerned Scientists, Washington, D.C. In his comments on Professor Griffith's paper, Edwin Lyman takes a more narrowly focussed approach to Nuclear Waste security than does Griffith. Lyman considers that the details of the "purely technical aspects" of this issue are more complex than Griffith suggests, and that an understanding of them is fundamental to any nuclear waste management program. Lyman outlines the key technical issues which must be faced and are not being addressed. He is highly critical of the U.S. government's apathetic response to public concerns over nuclear waste security subsequent to the September 2001 terrorist attacks. He is concerned that the nuclear industry may not be willing to underwrite the large costs of providing the required high level of security needed for public safety.

 

If that is the case in Canada, he suggests a Canadian public dialogue on questions surrounding the future of nuclear power plants and spent fuel production in the face of increasing terrorist threats. Nuclear Waste Saga home

 

READ:  The Great Canadian Nuclear Waste Saga:  http://www.web.net/~robbins

                    
Feb. 2006

On a road trip across the United States last Spring, it became increasingly evident to me  that an energy revolution is in progress there.  It was not just the visibility of the many wind farms that are springing up, or more hybrid cars and various energy saving initiatives.  It was the fact that state and local governments along with NGO’s are seriously and actively working to reduce energy consumption and develop renewable alternatives.  They are not just talking about it; they are doing it!

Back in the Summer of 2001, widespread blackouts were predicted for energy greedy California.  They did not occur and in that period alone, spearheaded by a range of incentives from their state government, Californians reduced their consumption of electrical energy by as much as 5500 megawatts. 

I’m sure that Ontario Power Authority (OPA) and the Ontario Government are well aware of the many such developments in North America and around the world.  In spite of the fact that some countries, such as China,  still opt for the construction of large scale, centralized electrical energy plants of one kind or another, the real trends are in the opposite direction.  And even China is starting to look at the new realities of the 21st century.

A decentralized electrical energy system in Ontario would not only reduce the impact of power disruptions, it would increase and spread-out the economic benefits across the province.  In addition, failure to adopt clean-coal technology for existing plants to help manage the transition, can only be viewed as myopic.

All of the great advantages of a cutting edge decentralized system of renewable energy and conservation are well documented in the Ontario Clean Air Alliance (OCAA) study which is very critical of the OPA plan, especially as it relates to the possible construction of more nuclear plants.

Nuclear energy is a very expensive way to boil water, as the resulting never-ending debt load carried by Ontarians demonstrates.  I hate to think of what another round of that kind of fiscal irresponsibility would bring to all of us. 

Ontario is moving away from its historical role as a high-electrical consumption, industrial manufacturing bastion to a very different kind of economy; essentially a knowledge-based, low energy consumption one.  As OCAA points out, Ontario’s electricity demand growth has been “moderating” for the last half century.

As for impacts on air quality, nuclear reactors themselves may not produce the various noxious substances in our air, but they do produce high-level radioactive waste which will be deadly to living things for hundreds of thousands of years. In my view, the industry-based Nuclear Waste Management Organization’s proposals are badly flawed.  Ultimately, if implemented,  they will return us to the late 1970's and early 80's when many Ontario communities were terribly disrupted in a fruitless search for a nuclear dumping ground. 

Furthermore, uranium mining, milling and refining processes, with their mountains of hazardous tailings, do contribute to poor air quality. And, it has been estimated that  as a non-renewable resource, uranium will not only cost more, but, in time, the amount of energy needed to get it to reactor fuel rod status will likely exceed the energy actually produced by the reactors. Not much of a bargain for society there!

Designing and keeping those reactors running properly and safely requires near “heroic” efforts.  Only one bad slip, and the game is over.  No other energy  technology can make that claim.  

Given all the concerns over factors such as costs, safety, security, radiation health, waste management, it is difficult to understand why the Ontario Government and the OPA are so entranced with nuclear energy, an old technology which would be long gone, if not propped up
 by enormous public subsidies.

And, given the great importance and high priority of this issue, the current level of consultation undertaken by the Government of Ontario is woefully inadequate.  Nothing short of formal public hearings within the scope of provincial environmental laws and regulations are an absolute requirement. 

Trewalt

http://www.web.net/~robbins